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DEMOCRACY AND DIS-APPOINTMENT
Pamela S. Karlan*
THE TYRANNY OF THE M~ooRrrY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. By Lani Guinier. New York: The

Free Press. 1994. Pp. xx, 324. Cloth $24.95..
Russell Baker once described Alexis de Tocqueville as the most
widely quoted unread writer in America.1 Lani Guinier2 could certainly give Tocqueville a run for his money. Her nomination to
head the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
provoked a storm of controversy, centered in large part on a halfdozen snippets from her voluminous voting rights scholarship. The
President, who admitted that he had not previously read her work,
yanked the nomination after spending a seventy-five-mile helicopter ride with Guinier's seventy-seven-page Michigan Law Review
article and concluding that her ideas about "proportional'3representation" and the "minority veto" were "anti-democratic."
The battle over Guinier's nomination illustrated a key contention of her scholarship. Too often, when race is involved, the
American political system forecloses both candid discussion and efforts to build consensus. Instead, it produces polarized contests in
which individual aspirants for public office win or lose. The Tyranny of the Majority contains most of Guinier's previously published voting rights scholarship, along with an introductory essay
putting the pieces in context and reflecting on the nomination process. Two years after her hotly debated nomination, her book offers
a chance to think about the freighted question: What does Lani
Guinier mean?
* Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia;
Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.A. 1980, M.A. 1984, J.D. 1984, Yale Ed. In the interests of full disclosure, I note that: (i) I was Lani Guinier's colleague at the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., where we worked together in the voting

rights project, in part on cases she discusses in the book; (ii) I commented on drafts of most
of the articles reprinted in The Tyranny of the Majority; and (iii) I was an active partisan in
the controversy surrounding her nomination to be Assistant Attorney General. If the personal is political, then the academic is both.
1. Russell Baker, Off the Top of de Tocq., N.Y. TnMEs, Nov. 23, 1976, at 33.
2. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
3. Text of PresidentClinton's Comments on Withdrawal of Guinier Nomination, WASH.
Posr, June 4,1993, at A10. The article read by the President was Lani Guinier, The Triumph
of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MiCH.L.
REv. 1077 (1991).
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I. WHAT LANI GUINIER WROTE

Few legal scholars are as intimately involved as Lani Guinier
has been in creating the law they criticize. As a lawyer for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund during the 1980s,
Guinier was one of the prime movers behind the 1982 amendments
to the Voting Rights Act of 1965,4 the legislation that sets the backdrop for contemporary voting rights law.5 In addition, she litigated
the leading Supreme Court case interpreting amended section 2 of
6
that Act

-

Thornburg v. Gingles.

Section 2 requires that "the political processes leading to nomination or election" for public office be "equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens" protected by the Act's ban
on racial and language-based discrimination. 7 The statute is explicitly race- and group-conscious: it asks whether members of classes
defined by race are able to participate fully, and it expressly provides that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the [defendant] State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered" in deciding
whether an electoral system violates the statute.8
Congress amended section 2 to respond to the so-called second
generation of voting rights issues. 9 The first generation of voting
rights activity - which occupied the civil rights movement of the
early 1960s - focused on registering eligible black citizens and enabling them to cast their ballots. 10 Although the movement's immediate aim was to secure the formal right to participate in the
electoral process, activists were animated by a vision of "participatory democracy" in which voting would not only affirm individuals' senses of "self-worth and human dignity" (p. 45) but would
also serve as the starting point for a grass-roots effort to enact an
4. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 89 Stat. 402 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1
(1988)) (amending The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445).
5. For an account of the lobbying for and passage of the 1982 amendments, including
Guinier's role, see MICHAEL PERTSCHUcK, GIANr KILLERS (1986).
6. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). For a discussion of the Act's race consciousness and its
consequences, see Pamela S.Karlan, Our Separatism? The Voting Rights Act as an American
NationalitiesPolicy, 1995 U. CmI. LEGAL FOR. - (forthcoming).
9. P. 49. For more extensive discussions of the various "generations" of voting rights
analysis, see also, for example, Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, Editors' Introduction to QuIET REVOLuTIoN IN THE SouTm: THm IMpAcr oF Tmn VonrNo Rxoirrs Acr, 1965-

1990, at 3, 14-15 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QuarT
REVOLUrIoN]; Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some PessimismAbout Formalism,71
TEXAS L. REv. 1705, 1709-19 (1993) [hereinafter Karlan, The Rights To Vote].
10. First-generation political participation issues, while no longer the primary focus of
voting rights enforcement, remain important today. Guinier details continuing barriers to
black voting, such as restrictive registration practices and changes in polling places. See pp.
32-33.
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inclusive, progressive agenda in every aspect of American life. This
first-generation approach culminated in the portions of the 1965,
1970, and 1975 Voting Rights Acts that suspended literacy tests and
other discriminatory devices," provided for federal registrars and
election observers in particularly recalcitrant jurisdictions, 12 and required federal approval under section 5 for
any changes in voting
3
practices in specified states and localities.'
It soon became clear, however, that simply removing formal
barriers to registration and voting would not, by itself, realize the
civil rights movement's broader goals. Electoral rules such as winner-take-all at-large elections often resulted in the defeat of candidates sponsored by the black community, and allowed officials
elected by the white majority
to ignore the needs and interests of
4
their black constituents.'
Accordingly, the second generation of voting rights activity addressed the problem of racial vote dilution rather than outright disenfranchisement. The civil rights community shifted its focus from
grass-roots political action to litigation. Second-generation lawsuits
sought to empower blacks by providing them with an opportunity
to elect officials who would champion the needs of the black
community.
Gingles was the paradigmatic vote dilution case. In several areas of North Carolina where there were large, politically cohesive
black communities, the state drew multimember rather than singlemember legislative districts.' Given the level of racial bloc voting
within these multimember districts, the white majority in each district was usually able to defeat the candidates sponsored by the
black community. Although white voters constituted only a majority, they controlled election 'to all the seats. The remedy Guinier
achieved for her clients was the disaggregation of the multimember
districts into single-member districts.' 5 Some of the single-member
districts were majority black; in these districts, black voters were
able to elect legislators of their choice despite continued bloc voting
by the white community.
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973aa (1988).
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d, 1973f (1988).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). For a discussion of these various provisions, see Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language
Minorities,in QuINT REVOLunON, supra note 9, at 21, 30-32.

14. In fact, jurisdictions often instituted at-large elections and multimember districts in
response to increased black registration precisely because of their potential to dilute black
voting strength. Guinier was involved in a number of cases raising precisely this kind of
claim. See Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-59 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (discussing Alabama's adoption and modification of at-large systems for the purpose of diminishing black political power).
15. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 376-84 (E.D.N.C. 1984), affd. in relevant
part sub nonm Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42-51 (1986).
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In the wake of Gingles, the trend towards single-member districting accelerated. 16 The Court soon extended Gingles's analysis
to districting schemes as well.17 Measured in terms of the election
of black candidates, Gingles was a smashing success. The number
were elected from maof black elected officials, almost all of whom
18
jority-nonwhite districts, skyrocketed.
And yet the inclusionary promises of the civil rights movement
seemed as far .away as ever. At the very outset of her scholarly
career, Guinier pointed to a key source of the problem: eight years
of Reaganism had deliberately polarized the debate over civil rights
issues (p. 22). The administration had repudiated the idea of "consensus" and had "recast civil rights as 'special interest' politics."' 9
This left officials elected by black communities politically isolated
and relatively powerless within elected bodies. Thus, we now face a
"third generation" of voting rights issues connected with questions
of postelectoral representation and power within elective bodies,
even as the gains of the second generation are coming under serious
attack. Guinier's scholarly project has had two primary goals: to
identify and evaluate the assumptions underlying second-generation voting rights law, and to suggest new means for rebuilding a
pro-civil rights consensus and fostering a progressive, participatory
politics.
A.

Why Not the "BEST"? Guinier's Critique of Current Voting
Rights Doctrine

Guinier identifies the prevailing second-generation wisdom as
"black electoral success theory" (p. 54). Elsewhere, Guinier
has
20
used the ironic acronym "BEST" to describe this theory. Put
briefly, Guinier sees BEST as essentially beginning, and unfortunately ending, with the question whether black candidates are being
elected. BEST assumes
16. For discussions of this trend towards single-member districts, see, for example, Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election Structure on Black
Representation in Eight Southern States, in Qumr REVOLUTON, supra note 9, at 301, 317,
320; Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority
Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and CongressionalDelegations, in QumT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 335, 336, 339-40.
17. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
18. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second
Reconstruction, in QuiET REvoLtuON, supra note 9, at 378, 385.
19. P. 24. Guinier quotes a memorandum from William Bradford Reynolds, the Assis-

tant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, to his subordinates, in which
Reynolds states, "In addition, we must polarize the debate. We must not seek 'consensus,'
we must confront." P. 194 n.9.
20. See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of SingleMember Districts,14 CARnozo L. REv. 1135, 1151 (1993).
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that black representatives are (1) authentic psychological and cultural
role models, whose election (2) mobilizes black voter participation,
(3) reduces electoral polarization by transforming cross-racial contact
from the anonymity and ignorance of the ballot box to the intimacy
and expertise of the legislature, and who (4) respond to the needs of
all their constituents, including poor blacks.21
BEST embodies both a goal - political empowerment of black citizens -

and a means -

the creation of majority-black geographi-

cally defined electoral districts.
Although Guinier describes her analysis as a criticism of BEST,
her work does not involve a wholesale rejection of BEST. Rather,
it is an argument that BEST conceives of its goals only incompletely
and relies on a strategy that cannot fully realize even those incomplete goals. 22
First, Guinier argues that while there is some value in having
black representatives who serve as visible symbols of inclusion and
as "role models" (p. 56), it is wrong to assume that an official's race,
without more, makes her an adequate representative of the black
community. Descriptive representativeness, standing alone, is only
an incomplete form of authenticity. The focus should be not on the
race of the official but instead on whether minority voters have the
ability to elect the representatives -

of whatever race -

they pre-

fer and on whether these officials can effectively represent their interests. Thus, the theory's concentration on descriptive
representation obscures inquiry into the question whether the official is a true and effective champion of the voters' interests.
This issue of authenticity was one of the flash points in the debate over Guinier's nomination. Her opponents claimed that
Guinier had suggested that Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder
was not an "authentic" black.23 That charge was nonsense. In fact,
what Guinier wrote was that Wilder's narrow margin of victory,
which some observers had ascribed to support from (overwhelm21. This formulation of BEST, which is the most succinct statement of the relationship
among its four assumptions of (i) "authenticity"; (ii) "mobilization/electoral control"; (iii)
"polarization"; and (iv) "responsiveness/reform," (p. 54), was contained in a part of Lani
Guinier, No 7Tvo Seats: The Elusive Questfor PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413, 142324 (footnote omitted) (1991). This part is omitted from The Tyranny of the Majority because
it simply recapitulates the argument laid out in The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 3,
which appears in The Tyranny of the Majority as the chapter before No Two Seats. See p. 41
(explaining the elision of the two articles).
22. This argument demonstrates one of the ways in which, as Guinier writes in her Introduction, her thinking has evolved. P. 13. Compare id. at 34-35 (describing the enhancement
of minority turnout that accompanies the prospect of electoral success, the general responsiveness of black elected officials to their constituents, and the deference white congressional
representatives pay to their black colleagues on issues of special concern to the black community) with id. at 59-60, 61-66 (criticizing these assumptions of BEST).
23. See, eg., Paul A. Gigot, Hillary's Choice on Civil Rights: Back to the Future WALL
ST. J., May 7, 1993, at A14.
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ingly white) single-issue prochoice voters, might have "vitiated" his
"ability to govern on other issues important to the black community" (p. 219 n.110). Guinier cited warnings from other commentators that black voters' interests might lose out in a competition
against those of "Virginia's white-majority constituency - and
those of Wilder's large campaign contributors."24 Guinier's concerns went to the authenticity of Wilder's representation of the
black community's interests, and not remotely to the authenticity of
his status as a black person.
The expositional ambiguity of Guinier's argument, to which I
alluded earlier, may have abetted the critics' disingenuous reading.
At the outset, Guinier announces that she means to criticize the
"authenticity assumption" (p. 54). But her definition of authenticity sometimes embraces ideas she in fact does hold. At some
points, for example, she includes within the authenticity assumption
the emphasis on "community-based and culturally rooted leadership" or sponsorship by the black community (p. 55). At other
points - when she is clearly criticizing the authenticity assumption
- authenticity is simply a synonym for descriptive similarity (p.
58); in this view, a black elected official is definitionally an authentic representative of the black community.
Guinier's central criticism of authenticity goes only, I think, to
this latter definition. Her point is that electing people who are
black is only a "limited empowerment tool" (p. 58). Guinier does
not deny that it is an empowerment tool. Guinier seems to believe
that some degree of descriptive representation may be necessary in
a legitimate democracy. But she argues that the mere presence of
black faces is not sufficient to ensure that black voices get heard.25
In short, Guinier does value authenticity, but she has a broader,
more complex vision of what authentic representation requires.
24. P. 219 n.108 (quoting James A. Barnes, Into the Mainstream, 22 NAmT. J. 262, 264
(1990)).
25. See p. 40 ("[B]lacks remain seen, and not heard."). So, for example, the election of

black officials in majority-white jurisdictions does not guarantee authenticity, even if black
voters within the jurisdiction actually cast their ballots for the winning candidate, if the black
community would have elected a different candidate absent the need to forestall decisive bloc
voting by the white community.
A similar expositional ambiguity occurs in Guinier's discussion of the "polarization assumption." Pp. 60-66. BEST proponents start with the empirical premise that voting in
many jurisdictions is characterized by pervasive racial bloc voting. Guinier shares that premise: "As a general rule a majority of whites do not vote for blacks." P. 60. The next step in
the "assumption" is inescapable: in a majority-white jurisdiction characterized by racial bloc
voting, candidates preferred by the black community will lose. Guinier agrees. ld.Where
Guinier parts company with BEST is in her skepticism that racial bloc voting can be overcome simply by creating some majority-black constituencies that elect candidates responsive
to blacks. Given racial polarization, she warns, "electing black representatives may simply
relocate to the legislature polarization experienced at the polls." P. 61. Once again,
Guinier's rejection rests largely on the incompleteness of the assumption, rather than on its
wholesale incorrectness.
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for exam-

ple, if she had criticized a "physiognomy assumption" - her point
would have been less subject to dishonest manipulation.
A second deep flaw Guinier finds in BEST is that creating
"safe" majority-black districts may do very little to produce grassroots participation and engagement in the political process.
Although black turnout at the polls does increase the first time a
credible black candidate seeks office, turnout often drops off thereafter.26 Some black representatives ignore their constituents, while
others, particularly those who depend on the votes of nonminority
voters, must trim their sails, thereby making black voters feel "neglected and taken for granted" (p. 59). When black voters form a
"passive" electorate, they are subject to candidates who "simply
'manipulate racial symbols and language' to enlist support from the
poorest black constituents" without addressing the constituency's
substantive needs (p. 60). Without real constituent engagement in
the political process, representatives are not responsive to the policy preferences of those they represent.27
Third, Guinier argues that an exclusive focus on the creation of
black single-member districts does little to combat current, pervasive racial bloc voting (pp. 60-65). Although black candidates can
get elected from majority-black districts despite racial bloc voting
because blacks in those districts form the predominant bloc creating single-member districts does nothing to encourage or facilitate cross-racial coalition building because it isolates blacks and
whites in separate districts.
Guinier's fourth criticism is that BEST is too tied to the idea
that geography defines how representation should be accomplished.
The prevailing theory rests on carving a jurisdiction into discrete
geographic subdistricts. But relying solely on geography to determine which groups get districts in which they form a majority of the
electorate "excludes the possibility of representation for those
whose interests are not defined by, or consistent with, those in the
geographically defined district" (p. 84).
26. See p. 59. Indeed, once they are elected, officials may prefer low turnouts. See p. 99.
27. In her review of CHARLEs FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION - A FIRSTHAND AccouNT (1991), reprinted in chapter 6, Guinier suggests
that a similar sort of criticism might be applied to civil rights litigation generally: "By assuming that courts can overcome political obstacles and produce change without mobilization
and participation, public interest lawyers 'both reified and removed courts from the political
and economic system in which they operate.' Crucial resources and talent are siphoned off
into complex legal actions, which further weaken political efforts." P. 184 (footnote omitted).
At the same time, litigation - despite the ultimate settlement of most cases - does not
allow for the kind of dialogue and consensus building Guinier values. "[T]he adversarial
model does not depend on persuading the parties to compromise but simply declares who is
right.... A judiciary committed to ideological outcomes" - as Guinier believes Reagan and
Bush appointees to be - "is more likely to declare winners, without really listening to the
claims of the losers." P. 184.
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This poses two parallel dangers. First, some groups will not be
able to achieve direct representation at all, despite their size and
distinctiveness. For example, Latino voters often live in small, segregated pockets spread throughout a jurisdiction; it may be impossible to create a majority-Latino single-member district even when
Latinos are a substantial percentage of the population. 28 Similarly,
a substantial number of voters may have progressive politics, but if
they are randomly or uniformly spread across a jurisdiction, they
may form no geographically defined majorities. Second, voters
placed in districts in which they are not part of the predominant
group will have essentially no say in who is elected from their own
district and no say at all in the selection of the official who "virtually" represents their group-connected interests as a consequence of
her election from another district in which their group predominates. This was the analytic problem with United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,29 in which the Court presumed that a cohesive
Hasidic Jewish community split between two majority nonwhite districts would be virtually represented by white legislators elected
from districts in other parts of Brooklyn. Guinier concludes: "Districting provides no clear theoretical justification for resolving and may instead exacerbate - conflict between the interests of
competing minority groups. For example, subdistricting may set off
a 'political land grab' in which each minority group has a legitimate
but potentially unfulfilled claim to representation" (p. 84). By separating white voters from black voters who share common interests,
districting "limits the options of white, as well as black, voters" (p.
85).
Fifth, Guinier points out that even if black voters elect black
representatives from one or a few majority-black single-member
districts, "race-conscious districting may simply reproduce within
the legislature the disadvantaged numerical and racial isolation that
the majority minority district attempted to cure at the electoral
level" (p. 135). In fact, Guinier suggests that this legislative exclusion may be an unintended consequence of BEST's insistence that
black voters be placed into majority-black districts. The electoral
separation of blacks and whites may eliminate the incentive for
white representatives elected from homogenous white districts to
enlist in cross-racial coalitions, because they can "ignore black interests without adverse electoral consequences" (p. 65). Guinier
provides several striking examples of such legislative exclusion.
Black legislators in Louisiana, for example, were excluded from a
28. See Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, The 1990 New York City DistrictingCommission: Renewed Opportunity for Participationin Local Government or Race-Based Gerrymandering?, 14 CARnozo L. REv. 1175, 1207 (1993).
29. ,430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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secret meeting during whichwhite state legislators drew the state's
congressional districts (pp. 9, 75-76). A county school board in
Texas changed its operating procedures when the first Mexican
American won a seat, thereby inhibiting her from placing items on
the agenda (pp. 9, 75). And immediately after a section 2 lawsuit
resulted in the creation of a majority-black district and the election
of the first black county commissioner to an Alabama county commission, the incumbent white commissioners stripped individual
commissioners of their power to hire and supervise road crews the primary source of both patronage and discretionary public
works - and then assigned control over the road shop in the black
commissioner's district to a white commissioner (pp. 8, 76). Thus,
BEST has "transformed the [civil rights movement's] original goals
of broad-based voter participation, reform, and responsive representation into the shorthand of counting elected black officials" (p.
49) and has failed to transform the American political culture.
B. Better than BEST. Guinier'sProposals
Having criticized BEST and its virtually exclusive reliance on
territorially based single-member districts, Guinier asks whether
changes other than the adoption of geographically defined singlemember districts could'more fully transform our politics. To replace BEST, Guinier offers "proportionate interest representation"
(p. 55). This phrase encompasses Guinier's rejection of both the
prevailing perspectives on voting rights - the pure majoritarianism
of conservatives and neo-liberals (or are they neo-conservatives?),
and the BEST partisans' protectionism for racially or linguistically
defined classes.
Guinier's vision is proportionate in the sense that she rejects
winner-take-all rules, which she sometimes calls "zero-sum" solutions, in favor of systems that acknowledge that a "majority should
enjoy a majority of the power but [provide that] the minority
should also enjoy some power too" (p. 152). She advocates representation for people's interests rather than their status or their geographic residence. She seeks to go beyond the "relation between
the characteristics of the population and the physiognomy or cultural attributes of representatives, '30 to achieve representation of
points of view. "[T]he right to vote is a claim about the fundamental right to express and represent ideas. Voting is not just about
winning elections. People participate in politics to have their ideas
and interests represented, not simply to win contested seats" (p.
93).
30. Lani Guinier, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Where Do We Go From Here?,
in CoNMovERsMs n MIoNRI VOTG - Tr Vo-ING Rorrs Acr IN PERSPECrIVE 283,
285 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
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Cumulative Voting

Guinier's first recommendation for creating a nonmajoritarian,
interest-oriented election system involves cumulative voting for
county and municipal assemblies. In a cumulative system, each
voter is given a number of votes equal to the number of seats to be
filled, but she is free to distribute those votes among candidates as
she sees fit. She can choose among a variety of strategies "plumping" all her votes behind one candidate she supports intensely or, alternatively, casting her votes for an array of candidates
31
who form a "slate.1
Cumulative voting, like all voting systems, has a property known
as the "threshold of exclusion." This term refers to the size a group
must exceed before its members, voting strategically, can be sure to
clinch a spot on the elected body. Within a single-member district,
for example, the threshold of exclusion is fifty percent. Unless a
group of voters constitutes more than fifty percent of the electorate,
it may end up being shut out. Thus, single-member districting is,
within each district, straightforwardly majoritarian.3 2 The same is
true of pure at-large systems: no group can ensure the election of
candidates it supports unless it constitutes more than one-half the
electorate. By contrast, in cumulative systems, the threshold of exclusion is 1/(n+1), where n is the number of seats up for election. A
group larger than the threshold of exclusion whose members plump
their votes behind a single candidate is assured of victory. Thus,
any electoral district in a cumulative scheme is nonmajoritarian.
Guinier uses Chilton County, Alabama, as an example of the
benefits she sees in cumulative voting. Both the county commission
and the school board have seven members. Under the traditional
at-large system in place until 1988, each body was invariably composed of white Democrats only. As part of the settlement of a section 2 lawsuit, the county adopted cumulative voting. Accordingly,
the threshold of exclusion dropped from 50% to 12.5% (1/(7+1), or
1/8). As a result, for the first time, blacks were elected to both the
county commission and the school board. In addition, the first
Republicans ever to serve on each body were elected; and the
31. Pp. 14-15. A slate may be either prearranged by community groups, A la the "balanced tickets" of the old ethnic politics, see Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing:
Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA.L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1991), or individually chosen by the voter herself in a manner rather similar to putting together a plate at a
buffet.
32. It is possible for a group smaller than the threshold to get its candidate elected -

for

example, in a three-way race, a group constituting 40% of the electorate might have its candidate win by a plurality - but such a group is not certain to obtain representation. See
Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 222-23 (1989).
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school board elections produced the first female member as well. 33
After cumulative voting, the two bodies each contained three white
Democrats, three white Republicans, and one black Democrat.
Guinier offers three observations about these sorts of results.
First, cumulative voting gives more voters the ability to elect representatives of their choice. In Chilton County, for example, the prior
electoral system gave only white Democrats the ability to obtain
direct representation on the two bodies. Now, blacks and Republicans have also obtained representation. More broadly, any other
group of voters greater than 12.5% of the electorate - white
progressives, women, or evangelicals, for example - who felt intensely about a candidate could also plump its votes. Cumulative
voting thus enables each individual to decide for herself with whom
to affiliate, rather than being assigned to a district based on residence or race. It allows voters to form voluntary, mutable, nongeographic "districts" subject to "automatic, self-defined
apportionment based on shifting political or cultural affiliation and
interests" (p. 140). Voters redistrict themselves.
Second, cumulative voting obviates the need for race-conscious
remedies to provide racially fair outcomes. It may "avoid[ ] the resentment of race-conscious districting among groups that are not
protected under the Voting Rights Act" (p. 100) because it neither
districts nor involves any governmental race consciousness. It "allows for the possibility that not all members of a minority group
share common interests or common perceptions of their interests.
Nor does it assume that all'34members of the majority group are hostile to minority interests.
Third, Guinier believes that cumulative voting offers the potential to change the dynamic within legislative bodies. In Chilton
County, for example, no single bloc now holds a majority of seats.
Thus, to pass its proposals, each group must build coalitions. There
is no longer a monolithic white majority with the potential to freeze
out the black community's elected representative. Instead, there
are competing white blocs. Each has an incentive to build temporary coalitions with the black community's representative. Cumulative voting thus encourages shifting, fluid coalition politics in which
black voters, white Democrats, and white Republicans all have valuable chips to use. This more nearly attains, in Guinier's view, the
Madisonian notion of a pluralist political process. By disaggregat33. See Peter Applebome, Where Ideas That Hurt Guinier Thriv4 N.Y. TRMES, June 5,
1993, at A9.
34. Guinier, supra note 3, at 1148 n.331. Cumulative voting is in this sense an anti-essentialist solution. It "does not presume that all blacks will submerge their differences to present
a monolithic front. Where voting patterns suggest overwhelming majority but not unanimous
issue cohesion [among black voters], interest representation would allow dissenting blacks to
cast their votes as they chose." P. 98.
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ing "The Majority" into a series of "Madisonian majorities" shifting winning coalitions that "rule[ ] but do[ ] not dominate" (p.
4) - cumulative voting creates some of the conditions for more
truly democratic politics.
2. Legislative Voting Rules
Guinier recognizes that while cumulative voting solves some
second-generation voting rights problems, it may not fully cure the
third-generation problem of legislative exclusion. Even if black
voters elect a proportionate number of representatives, those representatives may find themselves politically marginalized within the
legislature. Guinier explains the problem as follows: "The paradox
is that by winning, blacks ultimately lose; as soon as they achieve
one electoral success, the focus of the discrimination shifts to the
legislative arena."' 35 She concludes, "Simply put, racism excludes
minorities from ever becoming part of the governing coalition" (p.
103).
Thus, Guinier suggests, voting rights law must look at voting behavior within the legislatufe as well. 36 Proportionate interest representation asks three questions about procedural rules within
collective decisionmaking bodies: "(1) [D]o they make black representatives necessary participants in the governing process; (2) do
they disaggregate an otherwise permanent, homogenous majority
faction; and (3) do they give dignity and satisfaction to the strongly
held sentiments of minorities?" (p. 104). The Voting Rights Act,
Guinier argues, gives each protected class "a right to have its interests represented, and... to have its interests satisfied a fair proportion of the time" (p. 104; emphasis omitted).
Guinier seeks to accomplish this proportionate interest representation through modifications of legislative operating rules to
produce "decisions [that] are not always measured in binary win/
lose terms, but may include compromise alternatives in which participants all gain something. ' 37 Her modifications "seek[ ] to promote the deliberative process by imposing voting rules that reduce
35. P. 82. Guinier wrote much of her discussions of legislative exclusion prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Presley v. Etowah County Commi., 502 U.S. 491 (1992), which
held that the county commission's decision to strip a newly elected black commissioner of the
traditional powers of his office was not covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. After Presley, she strongly criticized the Court for "overlook[ing] the racial fault line dividing those
who govern from those who merely vote." P. 180.
36. See also Karlan, supra note 32, at 236-39 (discussing legislative exclusion).
37. Pp. 248-49 n.59. At one point, Guinier offers jury deliberations as a model for restricting the decisionmaking process. P. 107. Juries may not turn out to be such a wonderful
analogy, because their decisions are often quite binary - between acquittal and conviction,
for example - and because compromise verdicts may in fact reflect a failure to perform their
sworn task. What really appeals to Guinier about juries seems to be only their requirement
of consensus decisionmaking rather than simply an up-or-down majority vote.
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the number of up and down votes, instead of inviting consensus
through compromise and trading of procedural resources" (p. 107).
Guinier tentatively suggests cumulative voting within the legislative body (pp. 107-08). This idea is not fully sketched out, but it
seems to involve presenting a "package" of legislative proposals to
be voted on simultaneously. A representative who felt strongly
about only a few bills

-

either affirmatively or negatively -

could

cast several votes on those bills while forgoing her vote on other
parts of this legislative "package. 38 Guinier does not pursue this
idea all that vigorously, perhaps because it would be impossible to
implement. In most legislatures, the form bills take is subject to so
much manipulation that a minority could be forced to expend all its
votes simply to block a few objectionable proposals, thereby both
making it impossible for the group affirmatively to enact anything
and stripping its members of an effective voice on the remaining
items on the agenda. No legislature uses internal cumulative voting, though many engage in the sort of legislative drafting and logrolling that it might resemble. Guinier's primary suggestion for
reform, however, capitalizes on a relatively common legislative
rule: supermajority voting.
Federal and state legislative decisionmaking rules are already
honeycombed with supermajority requirements.3 9 One notable example, exploited and lauded by vehement critics of Guinier's approach, is the Senate's three-fifths rule to invoke cloture: a
minority of forty-one Senators can prevent a bill that fifty-nine Senators strongly favor from even coming to a vote. 40 Such rules are
38. In her earliest work, Guinier proposed something similar with regard to federal judicial nominations. The Senate Judiciary Committee, she suggested,
could decline to consider any nominee until a sufficient number of nominations - such
as twenty or thirty - were made so as to enable the Committee to consider not only the
individual qualifications of each, but the impact of these twenty or thirty nominations as
a totality on the composition of the federal bench.
P. 39. Presumably, this sort of packaging or slating would increase the likelihood of a diverse
judiciary.
39. For catalogs of such rules, see, for example, Karlan, supra note 32, at 245-46; Note,
ExtraordinaryMajority Voting Requirements, 58 GEO. LJ. 411 (1969).
40. Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, reprintedin STANDING RuLEs OF THE
SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23 (1992).
Conservative commentator Paul Gigot got substantial mileage out of a comparison of
Guinier's view of supermajorities with John C. Calhoun's view of concurrent majorities. See
Gigot, supra note 23; see also JoaN C. CALHOUN, A DisouisrnoN ON GovE RNa r 22-30
(New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1854). But if Gigot really believed what he wrote, he should
have criticized fellow conservative pundit George Will instead. In a column in the Washington Pos4 Will supported the Republicans' filibuster against the Clinton economic package as
the height of democracy.
Is efficiency, understood as the ability to implement the majority's will quickly, the
primary value in government? Or is the primary value caution born of anxiety about
government power, caution that respects the right of an intense minority to put sand in
the gears of government?
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the functional equivalent of a "minority veto" (pp. 16-17, 108, 116,
260 n.119). Supermajority requirements invest numerical minorities with a bargaining chip because they may make black representatives "necessary participants in the governing process" by
preventing the majority from reaching the supermajority threshold
without them.41 They may also give satisfaction and "dignity to the
strongly held sentiments of minorities" by allowing their sentiments
to trump those of a bare majority and by forcing a slight majority to
deal directly with the minority's concerns. 42 Supermajority requirements, Guinier believes, can enhance the quality of the deliberative
process by requiring more discussion and debate and requiring a
more broad-based consensus for legislative action. 43 At the same
time, like cumulative voting, supermajority rules are "race-neutral";
thus "[d]epending on the issue, different members of the voting
body can 'veto' impending action" (p. 16). For reasons I explain in
the next section, however, Guinier's procedural solution is a
double-edged sword.
C. The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedFixes
Ultimately, Guinier's vision of political fairness can be satisfied
only if racial minorities receive "a fair share of substantive, legislative policy outcomes" (p. 40). Her scholarship, however, concentrates exclusively on legislative inputs - how representatives are
elected and what decisionmaking rules the legislature uses: "Concern over majority tyranny has typically focused on the need to
monitor and constrain the substantive policy outputs of the decisionmaking process. In my articles, however, I look at the procedural rules by which preferences are identified and counted." 44
Democracy is trivialized when reduced to simple majoritarianism - government by
adding machine. A mature, nuanced democracy makes provision for respecting not
mere numbers but also intensity of feeling.
George F. Will, The Framers' Intent, WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 1993, at C7.
41. Karlan, supra note 32, at 247. This was the result in Mobile, Alabama. The requirement that five of seven council members concur to pass a law or transact business made at
least some degree of black consent necessary, because three council members were elected
from majority-black districts and thus the assent of at least one of those districts' representatives was essential. See id. at 246-48.
Such requirements are, however, two-edged swords. One could easily imagine a jurisdiction, for example, where one of the four white council members was progressive and three
were quite conservative. A supermajority requirement in that jurisdiction would preclude a
black-white coalition from attaining its goals. See id.
42. Id. at 246.
43. This braking effect is precisely why conservatives like supermajority requirements.
See Will, supra note 40.
44. P. 14; see also p. 249 n.64 ("I recognize that some may criticize [my approach] as
outcome-oriented jurisprudence that improperly invades the province of the local legislature.
I believe that my focus on legislative decisional rules, not decisional outcomes, adequately
answers this criticism.").
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But without some substantive theory of when and how often minorities should prevail, Guinier cannot provide a measuring stick
for assessing whether the existing system, particularly as to legislative decisionmaking, is working fairly. Most individuals of goodwill
would probably agree that there is something wrong if forty percent
of a city's residents are black and yet there has never been a black
city council member, or if black elected officials are locked out of
the room while white officials deliberate, or if a local government is
completely unresponsive to the needs of a sizeable black constituency.45 But what if blacks are only fifteen percent of the population
and there is a three-member city council? Should the city expand
the council's size to five members and impose cumulative voting so
that the black community will be able to elect a candidate? 46 What
if white representatives listen to the impassioned speeches of their
black colleagues and seriously debate the merits of their proposals,
but simply disagree and vote those proposals down? True, a
supermajority requirement may give a black legislative caucus a
"veto" over truly objectionable legislation, but it may do little to
fortify an affirmative legislative strategy. Indeed, supermajority
rules might actually impede such a strategy by denying progressive
majorities the ability to overcome the resistance of a conservative,
or even racist, minority. 47 Supermajority rules tend to favor the status quo by making change difficult to achieve. That, after all, is one
of the primary functions of the supermajority rules in Article V.
Moreover, disaggregation of the white majority into competing
blocs will provide opportunities for representatives from the black
community only to the extent that the benefits to a white representative of logrolling with the black representative exceed the benefits
of rebuilding a white consensus. If Guinier criticizes partisans of
the "swing vote" theory in popular elections and argues that the
election of black representatives "may simply relocate to the legislature polarization experienced at the polls" (p. 61), then she needs
to explain why swing voting in the legislature would be any more
likely to result in the enactment of desirable policies. Other propo45. See, eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (holding that the at-large system of
elections in Burke County, Georgia, resulted in unconstitutional vote dilution, demonstrated
by the absence of black members on the Board of Commissioners, despite a black majority
population); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that disparities
in providing municipal services to black residents resulted in denial of equal protection), affd.
on rehg., 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. Cf. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (holding that the size of an elected body is
not subject to scrutiny under § 2). In McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D.
Ill.), appeal dismissed, 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1987), for example, the size of the city council
had to be expanded in order to create a majority-black single-member district.
47. This was certainly the effect of U.S. Senate supermajority rules that gave racist southern senators the ability to prevent any effective civil rights legislation from being passed prior
to the 1960s.
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nents of cumulative voting have pointed to the greater possibility
for cross-racial consensus in intimate, repetitive settings such as legislative chambers, 4s but Guinier expresses deep skepticism about
these assumptions (p. 63). Without such a mechanism, Guinier's
proposal ultimately faces the same risk as the system she seeks to
replace.
In light of claims that Guinier is too pessimistic about racial progress inthe United States, 49 it is ironic that the most puzzling part
of The Tyranny of the Majority is Guinier's optimism. In the face of
three generations of voting rights problems, the persistence of racial
bloc voting, and continuing levels of racial polarization in society as
well as in politics, she nonetheless argues that cumulative voting or
supermajority requirements will do more than marginally improve
black political prospects. Guinier has offered a radical - in the
sense of fundamental, rather than far left - critique of existing
doctrine with its reliance on geographic districting, its complacency
once black faces appear in the legislative chamber, and its equation
of majoritarianism with democracy. But her skepticism of claims
that either black enfranchisement or black electoral success can
transform our politics leaves open the question why she thinks
other procedural rules will have a more deeply transformative effect. As the Supreme Court noted in explaining why school desegregation law alone could not be expected to resolve the myriad
social problems revolving around race, "[o]ne vehicle can carry only
a limited amount of baggage.s 0 Similarly, though the Voting
Rights Act is undoubtedly "one of the most monumental laws in
the entire history of American freedom,"' electoral reform, even
of the profound type that Guinier champions, cannot completely
transform American politics. Jimmy Carter once promised us a
government as "good and honest and decent and truthful and competent and compassionate and as filled with love as are the American people. '52 Sad but true, that is what our electoral system
produces. To the extent that America is often still burdened with
48. See, eg., Karlan, supra note 32, at 216-19.
49. See, eg., Charles Fried, President Clinton Won't Give Me A Job Either, 2 RECONsmucnON MAO., 127, 128 (1994) (asserting that Guinier's work "bespeak[s] a sympathy for
the hard-bitten view that racism in this country is far worse, far more pervasive, and far more
ineradicable than many of us would like to think"); Randall Kennedy, Lani Guinier's Consti.
tution, AM. PRosPEcr, Fall 1993, at 36, 44 (asserting that one weakness in Guinier's analysis
is her "tendency... to minimize the substantial reforms that have transformed race relations
over the past half-century"); A Civil Rights Struggle Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993, § 4
(Editorial), at 14 (suggesting that Guinier's work downplays the changes that followed the
enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act).
50. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971).
51. DAvrD J.GARROw,PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KINo, JR., AND THE VoT-

rNG Rioirrs Acr OF 1965 at 132 (1978) (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson).

52. For one version of this oft-repeated quotation, see Lynn Langway, Huckstering the
Candidates,NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1976, at 87.
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the crippling effects of three centuries of overt, state-sponsored racism and is occasionally prone to fresh eruptions of bias, our politics
will reflect the ugly side of who we are, no matter how democratic
and how inclusive the rules we use.
II.

How LANI

GUINIER HAS BEEN READ

Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in'
shape of a
camel?
Polonius: By th' mass and 'tis, like a camel indeed.
Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel.
Polonius: It is back'd like a weasel.
Hamlet: Or like a whale. 53
Polonius: Very like a whale
The debate about voting rights is hardly academic. Barely a
fortnight after the Clinton administration withdrew Guinier's nomination, the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno s4 cast serious
doubt on the continued vitality of race-conscious districting.5 5 Just
last Term, in Holder v. Hall,5 6 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, borrowed heavily from Guinier's analysis to argue for aban57
doning the entire enterprise of judicial oversight.
But there is another debate - this one largely within the law
schools - in which Guinier herself, as much as the content of her
writing, has constituted a flash point. Many people who are not
deeply, or perhaps even casually, interested in Guinier's work have
been quite interested indeed in what Guinier's nomination tells
them about our work - legal scholarship. What is legal scholarship about? To what extent do we demand realism, particularly
about the likely acceptability of scholarly positions within the legal
or political process? To what extent is scholarship a free-floating
thought experiment? How does scholarship relate to advocacy?
Does, or should, scholarship disqualify one from public office?
53. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 2, sc.

2, 11.
355-61 (Bedford Books 1994).
54. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
55. For discussions of Shaw, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and
Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588
(1993); A. Leon Higginbotham, Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FoRoHAm L. REv. 1593 (1994); Pamela S.Karlan, All Over the
Map: The Supreme Couri's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 Sup. Or.REv. 245; Richard H. Pildes
& Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-DistrictAppearancesAfter Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH.L. REv. 483 (1993); Conference,
The Supreme Cour4 Racial Politics,and the Right to Vote. Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the
Voting Rights Act, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1994) (conference among voting rights scholars and
litigators); Thomas C. Goldstein, Note, Unpackingand Applying Shaw v. Reno, 43 AM. U. L.
REv. 1135 (1994).
56. 114 S.Ct. 2581 (1994).
57. See 114 S. Ct. at 2591-2619 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). For Guinier's response, see Lani
Guinier, [EiracingDemocracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REv. 109 (1994).
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Guinier's dis-appointment seemed to offer a concrete occasion for
pursuing these questions.
Last year, in A Nation Under Lawyers,58 Harvard Law School
professor Mary Ann Glendon issued a stinging indictment of contemporary legal education and scholarship. The legal realists who
dominated law schools during the mid-twentieth century, according
to Glendon, possessed "an appetite and energy for creative problem solving that yielded innovative... legislation. '59 These realists
were "interested in ordinary politics and [came] to appreciate consensus building. ' 60 They employed a form of dialectic reasoning
that "attends to available data and experience, forms hypotheses,
tests them against concrete particulars, weighs competing hypotheses, and stands ready to repeat the process in the light of new data,
experience, or insight. '61 The realists, among whose heirs Glendon
counts herself, "would have been skeptical about their successors'
preference for litigation over ordinary politics" and "repelled by
the current vogue for pure theory." 62 Contemporary law schools,
Glendon argues, suffer from the "dwindling number of professors
with background or interest in practice" 63 and from academic neglect of critical aspects of the American political and legal tradition
"deliberation, voting, legislation, [and] local government." 64 On
the other hand, Glendon does see some rays of hope - in the
"scholar's commitment to pursue knowledge wherever it leads and
whatever its unpopularity, '65 and in the scholarly agendas of
professors such as John Langbein of Yale, who has "created an academic subject out of a complex regulatory field that did not even
exist when he graduated from law school" - 66 pension law - and
who has been active in law reform activities.
Glendon's analysis suggests she should find much to applaud in
Guinier's career profile and scholarly project. Guinier spent over a
decade as a government official, lobbyist, and public-interest litigator shaping and enforcing the statutory scheme her scholarship
studies. She thus had more practical experience than virtually any
other recent entry-level scholar at a top-ranked law school. Like
Langbein, Guinier and a half-dozen other young legal scholars "created an academic subject out of a complex regulatory field that did
58. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAwYERs: How THE CRISIS INTHE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN Socmry (1994).

59. Id. at 194.
60. Id. at 195.
61. Id. at 238.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 178.
Id. at 223.
Id at 219.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 245.
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not even exist when [they] graduated from law school." 67 Guinier's
writing focuses primarily on "deliberation, voting, legislation, [and]
local government." 6 Her articles propose "creative problem solving" - alternative remedies directed at getting beyond the common wisdom of BEST and devising mechanisms for encouraging a
greater degree of "consensus" to help to open up the processes of
"ordinary politics" to all citizens. 69 In particular, given Guinier's
central involvement in the creation of BEST during her career as a
voting rights litigator, Guinier seems the very model of Glendon's
vaunted dialectical legal thinker. After contributing to the prevailing hypothesis, Guinier then tested BEST against the concrete particulars of continuing political exclusion from several state and local
legislative bodies. Guinier also considered new data from jurisdictions that had adopted alternative voting systems and proposed a
new way of understanding and enforcing the Act.
Guinier's life and work make it especially puzzling that Glendon, who never mentions Guinier in A Nation Under Lawyers,
chose Guinier as the prime example in an op-ed piece entitled
What's Wrong With the Elite Law Schools. 70 Glendon wrote that
the reception Guinier's work has received, and, implicitly, Guinier's
work itself, "raises a question about the milieu in which her ideas
were developed, tested and first aired. ' 71 But besides noting that
Guinier is in her mid-forties, Glendon never bothered to ask what
Guinier's milieu was. She merely suggested that Guinier's approach was a function of her legal education during the early 1970s.
But Guinier was of course more likely to have developed and tested
her ideas during her service at the Department of Justice from 1977
to 1981 and at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for seven years
during the 1980s. To suggest that Guinier suffers from "a zany passion for novelty" or "a confusion of advocacy with scholarship"2
seems equally incongruous given the extensive historical use of cumulative voting and supermajority requirements and Guinier's ex67. See id.
68. Id at 219.
69. Id. at 198 (celebrating the "one-man, one-vote cases" - those betes noires of the
common-law lawyers' hero John Marshall Harlan the younger - because they "showed that
lawyers could help to open up ...political participation to all citizens"). Of course, urban
and suburban voters were in no sense prevented from participatingin politics before the oneperson, one-vote cases. They simply had their votes diluted relative to the votes of rural
residents. See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of
Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982) (tracing the development of the problem of minority vote dilution).
70. Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong With the Elite Law Schools, WA.u ST. J., June 8,
1993, at A16.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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plicit criticism of the approach with which she had been associated
as a litigator.
Glendon concluded her op-ed by asserting that Guinier's "fate
...should send two messages" to the legal academy: first, that
scholars should abandon work like Guinier's in favor of "painstaking work within a living, dynamic, self-critical tradition," and second, that the "elite disdain for politics through bargaining,
education and persuasion" would "blight... the ability of promising young scholars to contribute constructively to public life."' 73
Glendon is not, and does not claim to be, a scholar in voting rights
law. It is therefore not surprising that she seemed relatively unaware of the long-standing debates that form the living, dynamic voting rights tradition within which Guinier works - a tradition both
within the academic community of political scientists, historians,
and lawyers who write about voting and in the larger public community of legislatures, courts, and litigators who have constructed
and amended voting rights doctrine. 74 It is somewhat less excusable
for Glendon to assume that Guinier's belief in a consensus-driven,
rather than a purely majoritarian, political process manifests elite
disdain, rather than celebration, of bargaining and politics. It is one
thing to disagree with Guinier's conclusions; it is quite another to
say that they indicate she is not a scholar. Glendon seems more
interested in continuing a battle over the "hot-house environment"
of legal academe 75 than in engaging the substance of Guinier's
ideas. Perhaps the problem is not "[t]he ratio of 'practical' to 'theoretical' articles" within the law journals, 76 but rather the ratio of
articles about law, however the field is defined,
to articles about 77
apparently unread - articles about law.
73. Id.
74. For example, several proposals to adopt cumulative voting as a remedy in voting

rights cases - including one made by a full-time practicing lawyer - antedated Guinier's
articles by over five years. See, eg., Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, in
MNorr= Vo-E DILUtoN 249 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE LJ.144 (1982). See generally
Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportionaland Proportional Representation Systems in the United
States, in CHoosiNG AN ELECrORAL SYSTEM: IssuES AND ALTERNATIVES 191 (Arend
Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984). Other scholars had previously examined how cumulative voting had actually worked when used as a remedy. See, e.g., Richard L. Cole et al.,
Cumulative Voting in a MunicipalElection: A Note on Voter Reactions and Electoral Consequences, 43 W. Poi- Q. 191 (1990); Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L & POL 469

(1989); Richard L. Engstrom & Charles Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative Voting: The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 Soc. Scj. Q. 338 (1991); Karlan, supra note 32, at 23136; Delbert A. Taebel et al., Alternative Electoral Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote
Dilution, 11 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POLY. 19 (1990).

75. Glendon, supra note 70, at A16.
76. Id.
77. For three relatively short and accessible examples of how other scholars perceived
both Guinier's ideas and the controversy over her nomination, see S-rmHN L. CARmER, THE
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Starting ostensibly with very different premises, both about
scholarship and about the merits of Guinier's nomination, Robert
Post of Boalt Hall reached an incongruously similar conclusion
about the lessons for legal scholarship from Guinier's dis-appointment.78 Post identified two strands of legal scholarship - the traditional and the utopian. Traditional scholarship, in Post's view,
"attempts to establish the meaning of a statute by extrapolating the
intent of the legislature which enacted it." 79 It is realistic in that it
remains aware of the relationship "between the legal implementation of statutes and the political will that enacted them. 80o Its
strength "lies in its humility, in its respect for the political reconciliation of difference and for the values of existing social institutions."81 Utopian scholarship, by contrast, argues that legal
arrangements are to be justified by their congruence with "moral
vision"; it is "thus prepared to use law to pursue radical reconstitutions of society." 82 Rather than addressing the "ordinary politics"
of legislation, utopian politics seems, in Post's view, to address itself
to judges - perhaps, though Post did not himself say this, because
of the still-glowing embers of liberal faith in the Warren Court.
Post claimed that Senator Joseph Biden's suggestion - that
Guinier could be confirmed only if she could
come up here [to Capitol Hill] and ... convince people that what she
wrote was just a lot of academic musing.... If she comes up here and
says she believes in the theories that she sets out in her articles
and is
83
going to pursue them, [then she would] not [have] a shot
shocked him "into a wholly different picture of law."'84 As a
result of the controversy Guinier's nomination spawned, Post perceived a central flaW with the utopian approach: because it rests on
moral visions that reflect simply the "political perspective appropriate to the citizen," utopian scholarship ultimately "offers no justification for claiming scholarly expertise with respect to the
ascertainment and advocacy of [political] purposes."85
CONFIRMATION MEss: CLEANiNG Up Tim FEDERAL APP6nTMENS PROcEss

37-44 (1994);

Fried, supra note 49, at 128-31; Kennedy, supra note 49, at 38-46.
78. Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11
CONST. COMMENTARY 185 (1994).

79. Id. at 189.
80. Id. at 190.
81. Id. at 191.
82. Id. at 190.
83. Id. at 185 (quoting Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Urge Withdrawal of Rights Nominee, N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1993, at Al (emphasis deleted)).
84. Id. at 193.
85. Id. at 194-95.
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Seen in this light, for Post, Lani Guinier was "a misfortune...
simply waiting to happen. '8 6 In Post's reading, Guinier sets forth
an essentially utopian interpretation of the Voting Rights Act; obviously, she is not attempting to interpret the statute Congress originally enacted.8 7 Moreover, her approach is utopian because, rather
than appealing to Congress with "a frank proposal for legislative
amendment of the Voting Rights Act," Guinier's writing is "implicitly addressed to judges" - essentially asking them to implement
her moral vision of the Act.88 It reflects the utopian scholar's distrust of the "opportunities of ordinary politics." '8 9 Post comments,
"surely such alienation lies at the source of Guinier's own work." 90
The rejection of Guinier's ultimately political perspective - "the
prerogatives of the expertise were abruptly dismissed" 91 - reminded scholars "that in Washington truth rightly does not command political opinion, even truth about politics." 92
Of course, a central problem with Guinier's nomination was that
few of the participants - and almost certainly not Senator Biden
or the bulk of the news media - were aware of the truth as to what
she had written, even leaving aside the question whether they
would have agreed with the truth of what she had written.93 But
even as generally sympathetic an observer as Post seems to have
misread much of Guinier's work. In fact, Guinier's work is not primarily addressed to courts. The implicit audience for her critique
of BEST is more plausibly, at least in the first instance, the civil
rights community, particularly its litigating members. Guinier's
analysis necessarily rested on a blend of expertise: a historical understanding of the goals of the civil rights movement that had
viewed the Act as a centerpiece of its strategy for empowerment; a
political scientist and sociologist's understanding of problems of
turnout, racial bloc voting, and electoral responsiveness; and a practitioner's understanding of the pressures, both from courts and from
the client base, for neat and tidy solutions to sprawling problems.
Utopian is a somewhat inaccurate adjective even for Guinier's proposed solutions - some, but not all, of which were addressed, at
least ultimately, to a judiciary that would be asked by litigators to
implement expansive remedies. Guinier had already participated in
86. Id. at 194.
87. See id. at 189-90.
88. Id. at 190-91.
89. Id. at 192.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 195.
92. Id.
93. For a thorough discussion of this point, see Laurel Leff, From Legal Scholarto Quota
Queen: What Happens When PoliticsPulls the PressInto the Groves of Academe, CoLuM. L.
REv., SeptiOct. 1993, at 36.
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a series of cases adopting cumulative voting, and close colleagues
had been involved in crafting the legislatively imposed
supermajority remedy in Mobile, Alabama. 94
Post comes closer to the truth of the Guinier case, I think, with
an aside he makes during a paragraph in which he compares
Guinier's experience with Robert Bork's: "Perhaps because issues
of race are so highly explosive and because the margin of publicly
accepted positions is consequently quite constricted, Guinier's
views were dismissed out of hand." 95
The Voting Rights Act is a complex, technical, regulatory statute. But the Act trenches directly on questions of basic political
theory and reality, and it does so in the context of the most divisive
issue in America today - race. Even if Guinier's scholarship had
focused solely on questions of legal expertise, she would have faced
precisely the same problem. Whether racial bloc voting exists is a
technical question subject to the application of social science expertise like that Guinier introduced into the legal doctrine in Gingles.
But all the statistics Guinier could muster were ultimately powerless in the face of a deep desire to ignore, or reject, "the hard-bitten
view that racism in this country is far worse, far more pervasive, and
far more ineradicable than many of us would like to think. ' 96 The
availability of alternatives to the dominant remedial approach is
similarly a question, at least in part, of technical political science to
which legal scholars might profitably contribute some expertise.
But again, when race is involved, facts take a decided back seat to
deeply held values. Even Guinier's entirely legalistic, scholarly
truths were unpalatable to the politics of the moment. Guinier's
experience was, as I suggested at the beginning of this review, a
signal example of the point her scholarship made - that the current climate of winner-take-all, candidate-driven politics affords too
94. Moreover, at the time she wrote her Michigan and Virginia Law Review pieces,
Guinier was involved in Presley v. Etowah County Commn., 502 U.S. 491 (1992), which
raised claims of postelection legislative exclusion in the context of § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. That Guinier's position lost, 6-3, hardly suggests that it was entirely outside the boundaries of what Congress intended. Indeed, the Bush administration's Department of Justice
supported the position of Guinier's clients.
The New York 71mes editorial page concretely illustrates that many observers simply lost
their heads during the nomination process. The paper's editorial board criticized Guinier for
being too pessimistic about the integration of black elected officials into governing bodies,
see A Civil Rights Struggle Ahead, N.Y. TnMmS, May 23,1993, § 4 (Editorial), at 14 (criticizing

Guinier because "[h]er articles depict legislatures and local councils that, for all the political
gains under the 1965 Voting Rights Act, remain racially polarized with blacks unable to influence laws or governance"), but earlier, when Presley was decided, the paper had excoriated
the Court for permitting precisely that result, see The Runaway Supreme Cour4 N.Y. TimFjs,
Feb. 2,1992, § 4 (Editorial), at 16 (claiming that the Voting Rights Act has not "stop[ped] the
stubborn resistance" of covered jurisdictions: "Blacks could get the vote, and even sue to
protect it -

but could only watch helplessly as the effect of voting was nullified").

95. Post, supra note 78, at 191.
96. Fried, supranote 49, at 128.

1296

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1273

few opportunities for genuine discussion and consensus building.
The ordinary
politics of Guinier's nomination was a deeply flawed
97
politics.

The Voting Rights Act is a battleground on which whites,
blacks, Latinos, Asians, Democrats, Republicans, federal and state
courts, Congress, and the D.epartment of Justice struggle for political power. Given the way in which each of these groups twists the
Act to serve its competing and occasionally even self-contradictory
purposes, it is hardly surprising that Lani Guinier was caught in the
crossfire. But now that at least some of the smoke has cleared, The
Tyranny of the Majority offers scholars who have so far sat on the
sidelines a chance to think and debate more deeply how law can
contribute to fundamental questions of political structure.

97. The deep flaws of the ordinary politics of the nomination process are explored in
CARTR, supra note 77.

